Imperial Japanese Army: The Essence of Failure

Circumstantial evidence points to the possibility that the Japanese Imperial Army showed many common features ¿ both positive and negative ¿ with present-day Japanese companies and organisations. This case on the Japanese Imperial Army perforce sheds light on the nature of the organisations in Japan and may allow us to enjoy certain level of insightful prediction. First and foremost, the Japanese Army offers an example of an induction-based organisation. Its inductive way of thinking during the Second World War resulted in an ambiguity of objectives by setting only a general direction, which sometimes allowed too much space for different units that they ended up by setting their own objectives. Learning by doing, making light of theory, lacking a mechanism to feed the analysis of the cause of failure back into the planning system, etc., were inductive elements that characterised the Japanese Army and led it to defeat in major battles as well as, ultimately, to its surrender in 1945.